U NU OF BURMA - BORN LEADER
Wednesday, May 29, 2013
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
၁၉၅၁ ဒီဇဘၤာလ ၂၂ရက္ ရန္္ကုန္တကၠသိုလ္ ဘြဲ႕ႏွင္းသဘင္ အခန္းအနား တြင္ ေျပာၾကားခဲ့ေသာ ၀န္ႀကီးခ်ဳပ္ ဦးႏု၏ မိန္႕ခြန္း
On December 22,
1951 Chancellor of the Rangoon University Prime Minister U Nu gave Convocation
Address: “Today I am to confer degrees
to the candidates who have succeeded in the University examination. But I want
to do more than that. I want to confer a charge to all students, not only to
the students here assembled, but to all students all over Burma. This
charge is none other than to bring about in this country of ours a state of
affairs which will no longer be fluid and unstable like the surface of the sea
but as firm as terra firma”.
He added: “Before I
expatiate on the magnitude of this charge let me go a little into the past
history of our Union of Burma.
Then only you will realize-
[1] how badly
dilapidated this Union of Burma
is,
[2] why she is so dilapidated,
[3] and how much
hard work lies ahead of us to build her up again”.
He went on briefly
dwelling into the history: “The history of Burma from the beginning at Tagaung
of Abhiraja to the end of Thibaw's reign has been a history of kings and kingdoms.
As you know, kings were not elected by the people but derived their power from
their own might and succession, so that, apart from such great kings as
Anawrahta, Bayinnaung, Alaungpaya and Mindonmin, most kings had very little to
do with the mass of the people. They seldom bothered themselves about the five
main pillars of Health, Education, Morals, Economics and National Solidarity,
which must support a nation. It was the people themselves who had to build and
tend these pillars as far as they were able throughout the course of history.
Thus throughout the course of history these five pillars had never been well
and truly set up. After Thibaw, there were the British rulers.
They too were not
elected by the people. They were here not to bother about the five pillars but
to exploit our country of rice, timber, oil and minerals. . . . Any country
under the Imperialist regime, whether it be Burma,
India or America, is sure to have its moral
pillars shaken and dilapidated. In such a state unrest and disorders will be
the order of the day. Therefore, in order to bring about a change from the
fluid and unstable state of affairs to one which is firm and stable like terra
firma, we have no other method but to rebuild and renovate to our utmost
capacity the five pillars which are in a sorry state. Mere crying over this
mess will not do. Mere clamoring to Government to restore immediate peace will
not do. Heaping blame on others and launching attacks on Government in a spirit
of desperado will not do. Longing for distant friends and beckoning them will
not solve our problems. Such measures, instead of improving matters, will make
them worse.
In fact mere guns
will not solve our problems. Stability wrought by guns is never enduring.
It will vanish once the guns are withdrawn. We do not want that type of
stability brought about by means of guns. We want that type of stability
which will endure whether there are guns or not, certain political
organizations or not, certain leaders or not.
The nature of
stability must be spontaneous and natural. Only then will it be safe for
everybody. To achieve this type of stability it is up to every one of us in the
Union to do our utmost to rebuild the sadly
dilapidated five pillars which I have enumerated.
In this noble task of rebuilding the
five pillars, you students with your brains and your background will form the
vanguard. . .
To rebuild the
pillar of Education, the country needs skilled technicians both in the
mechanical and handicraft spheres, skilled educationists, skilled scientists,
learned historians, men of letters and leaders of religions.
To rebuild the pillar of Economics,
the country needs men and women skilled in Banking, Foreign Exchange, External
trade and technicians who have a thorough knowledge of modern factories,
administration, etc.
To rebuild the
pillar of Morals, the country needs men and women who have made a life-long
study of various methods of moral uplift. To rebuild the pillar of National
Solidarity, the country needs able leaders who are endowed with foresight,
forbearance, public esteem and exemplary character. Who
are those architects worthy of being entrusted with the task of rebuilding
these pillars? It is certain that ignoramuses cannot be our architects. It
is you, educated men and women, who can play the role of the country's
architects”.
Last but not least,
Premier Nu reiterated: “I declare this both as Chancellor of this University
and in the capacity of Prime Minister. . . . I know for certain that the vast
majority of the students in this University are eager to discharge their
responsibilities with the sincere desire for the good of the masses, free from
political influences and political attachments. Let me address the leaders of
these sincere workers. The task of rebuilding the five pillars is not small.
Mere attainment of independence will not make these pillars strong. Independence merely
entails opportunities for carrying out works for the good of the people. It is
up to all of us to carry out these works in our respective spheres to our
utmost capacity. You must bear this in mind”.
Thursday, May 23, 2013
Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 47
47. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690B.93/3–3161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and CINCPAC.
Rangoon, March 31, 1961, 6 p.m.
774. James Barrington, Permanent Secretary, Burmese Foreign Office, conferred with Secretary Rusk at Embassy residence Bangkok, 7:00 to 8:00 P.M. March 29. Ambassadors Johnson and Snow also present.
11. Rusk was in Bangkok attending the SEATO Council meeting March 27–29.
Barrington first presented to Secretary a copy of Prime Minister U Nu’s play “The Wages of Sin”, stating U Nu particularly hoped Secretary would find time to read it. Secretary replied he had heard of play and was very happy to have a copy.
Then Barrington took up KMT issue in some detail, beginning with brief historical review. In 1953–54, because KMT irregulars had allied themselves with Shan and Karen insurgents who were seriously threatening continued existence of Burmese Union, GUB had taken case to UN. As Secretary would recall, GUB also terminated USG’s technical assistance program in Burma as consequence of charges it felt compelled to make against US in that connection. Evacuation of KMT irregulars undertaken in 1954 had not been thorough enough to remove them all. Moreover, Formosa Regime had re-supplied the remainder and, in recent years, increased their numerical strength and combat effectiveness.
The action initiated in 1961 to remedy situation, including current evacuation program, had been going quite well so far, but GRC had now begun to announce that program would be terminated mid-April. This was causing considerable concern in Rangoon because according to Burma army sources a group of at least 500 irregulars, who had first retreated to Northern Thailand, had now returned to Burmese territory and were moving Westward toward or into Kayah State. Back in 1952–53, KMTs, in conjunction with KNDOs, had occupied Loikaw, Capital of Kayah State. Danger now was that this group and other KMTs might again join forces with KNDOs and cause serious further trouble. In 1953–54, although Burmese government had become aroused over KMT issue to point where US-Burmese relations had suffered, the Burmese public had not been nearly as inflamed as it was now.
Barrington had been instructed to ask Secretary for all possible USG assistance in insuring that KMT problem was completely eliminated this time. Something needed to be done about the 500 irregulars he had referred to, and it would also be very desirable for GRC to extend evacuation program until combined efforts could bring about removal greatest possible number of KMTs. Barrington went on to say that Burmese Parliamentary Leaders were beginning to assert in debates that SEATO Bases had been used in support of KMTs and would be again. Burmese public opinion was picking up this theme and hostility was mounting against SEATO, whereas previously no strong feeling in Burma about SEATO other than clear decision on part of GUB not to consider membership therein. Barrington thought there were upward of 3,000 KMTs left in Burma, possible 3,500. Johnson and Snow both questioned these figures as appearing too high.
The Secretary in reply first pointed out that there were no SEATO Bases as such; there were merely bases situated in SEATO countries. Barrington acknowledged that in talking about SEATO in this sense, Burmese really meant Thailand, but since Thailand was neighboring country, Burmese did not like to accuse Thais directly for fear of damaging friendly relations.
The Secretary said that upon assuming office in January, he had been dismayed to find KMT issue, with which he had been so familiar in early fifties and even during World War II when he had served in the area in command of KMT troops, had arisen again as major problem. As Barrington knew, firm representations had been made in Taipei and much accomplished already toward resolution of the problem. GRC gave every evidence of sincerely and efficiently cooperating. US Government would continue to help in every appropriate way but he wished to make it clear that US was not involved; in short, the problem was not “our baby.” He had personally gone to considerable lengths since January to ascertain whether any branch of US Government, even at middle or lower levels, had been involved in or had even connived at KMT re-supply and build-up. He had found no evidence of any such thing. He realized that any country such as Burma had sensitivities but he thought GUB should appreciate that United States also had its sensitivities. President Kennedy, as his letter to Prime Minister U Nu must surely have revealed, had special interest in US relations with Burma. The President also had strong feelings and opinions on certain subjects. He had strong feeling with regard to US prestige and respect for our good faith and would not be prepared to have them put in question by anybody. There was, for example, the case of Lumumba’s death; USG had had no part whatsoever in his death and yet when certain people “pushed the button,” demonstrations occurred simultaneously against American Embassies in forty different countries. There had also been the mob action against our Embassy in Rangoon. We were not prepared to accept such actions with equanimity. Riots inspired or abetted by Governments against our Embassies were something we were “not having” and we looked to governments to take the proper steps to prevent them.
Barrington, after taking rather confused exception to implication that February 21 riot against Embassy Rangoon had been government-inspired (Note: It was in fact inspired by anti-US propaganda fed to press by Burma Army), sought to defend role of Rangoon police on that occasion, although he acknowledged police had not handled situation February 21 as well as they might have. Prime Minister had been out of town; other cabinet ministers had been indecisive; police had hesitated to start shooting; but two people were killed and fifty or more injured by police action.
After some further discussion about KMTs, the Secretary outlined briefly the current US position on Laos. The Russians had not yet replied to British proposal that cease-fire be agreed upon, to be followed by reactivation of ICC and convoking of 14-nation conference. British proposal, supported by USG, represented clear test of Communist intentions. If Communist countries persisted in their military and subversive efforts, “there would be trouble in Laos.” The Secretary believed that neither Burma nor other comparable nations wanted to see Laos go Communist.
Barrington agreed Burma did not want Communists to take over Laos. He supposed Russian hesitation in responding to British proposal had been occasioned by ChiCom objection to having an Indian again serve as Chairman of ICC in view of present tension in ChiCom-Indian relations. The Secretary said that since Burma realized the threat which Communism represented for Laos, GUB could play a most important part in the 14-Nation conference deliberations when the time came.
The Secretary asked Barrington if all other aspects of US-Burmese bilateral relationship were in reasonably good order. Barrington indicated he believed they were. The Secretary told Barrington that although American Ambassador in Rangoon was always available, he, himself, had retained his genuine interest in Burma and would be willing to hear personally from Barrington or other Burmese officials if they wished to bring some particular point to his attention in that way.
Snow
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690B.93/3–3161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and CINCPAC.
1 Rusk was in Bangkok attending the SEATO Council meeting March 27–29.
http://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/ frus1961-63v23
Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 47
47. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690B.93/3–3161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and CINCPAC.
Rangoon, March 31, 1961, 6 p.m.
774. James Barrington, Permanent Secretary, Burmese Foreign Office, conferred with Secretary Rusk at Embassy residence Bangkok, 7:00 to 8:00 P.M. March 29. Ambassadors Johnson and Snow also present.
11. Rusk was in Bangkok attending the SEATO Council meeting March 27–29.
Barrington first presented to Secretary a copy of Prime Minister U Nu’s play “The Wages of Sin”, stating U Nu particularly hoped Secretary would find time to read it. Secretary replied he had heard of play and was very happy to have a copy.
Then Barrington took up KMT issue in some detail, beginning with brief historical review. In 1953–54, because KMT irregulars had allied themselves with Shan and Karen insurgents who were seriously threatening continued existence of Burmese Union, GUB had taken case to UN. As Secretary would recall, GUB also terminated USG’s technical assistance program in Burma as consequence of charges it felt compelled to make against US in that connection. Evacuation of KMT irregulars undertaken in 1954 had not been thorough enough to remove them all. Moreover, Formosa Regime had re-supplied the remainder and, in recent years, increased their numerical strength and combat effectiveness.
The action initiated in 1961 to remedy situation, including current evacuation program, had been going quite well so far, but GRC had now begun to announce that program would be terminated mid-April. This was causing considerable concern in Rangoon because according to Burma army sources a group of at least 500 irregulars, who had first retreated to Northern Thailand, had now returned to Burmese territory and were moving Westward toward or into Kayah State. Back in 1952–53, KMTs, in conjunction with KNDOs, had occupied Loikaw, Capital of Kayah State. Danger now was that this group and other KMTs might again join forces with KNDOs and cause serious further trouble. In 1953–54, although Burmese government had become aroused over KMT issue to point where US-Burmese relations had suffered, the Burmese public had not been nearly as inflamed as it was now.
Barrington had been instructed to ask Secretary for all possible USG assistance in insuring that KMT problem was completely eliminated this time. Something needed to be done about the 500 irregulars he had referred to, and it would also be very desirable for GRC to extend evacuation program until combined efforts could bring about removal greatest possible number of KMTs. Barrington went on to say that Burmese Parliamentary Leaders were beginning to assert in debates that SEATO Bases had been used in support of KMTs and would be again. Burmese public opinion was picking up this theme and hostility was mounting against SEATO, whereas previously no strong feeling in Burma about SEATO other than clear decision on part of GUB not to consider membership therein. Barrington thought there were upward of 3,000 KMTs left in Burma, possible 3,500. Johnson and Snow both questioned these figures as appearing too high.
The Secretary in reply first pointed out that there were no SEATO Bases as such; there were merely bases situated in SEATO countries. Barrington acknowledged that in talking about SEATO in this sense, Burmese really meant Thailand, but since Thailand was neighboring country, Burmese did not like to accuse Thais directly for fear of damaging friendly relations.
The Secretary said that upon assuming office in January, he had been dismayed to find KMT issue, with which he had been so familiar in early fifties and even during World War II when he had served in the area in command of KMT troops, had arisen again as major problem. As Barrington knew, firm representations had been made in Taipei and much accomplished already toward resolution of the problem. GRC gave every evidence of sincerely and efficiently cooperating. US Government would continue to help in every appropriate way but he wished to make it clear that US was not involved; in short, the problem was not “our baby.” He had personally gone to considerable lengths since January to ascertain whether any branch of US Government, even at middle or lower levels, had been involved in or had even connived at KMT re-supply and build-up. He had found no evidence of any such thing. He realized that any country such as Burma had sensitivities but he thought GUB should appreciate that United States also had its sensitivities. President Kennedy, as his letter to Prime Minister U Nu must surely have revealed, had special interest in US relations with Burma. The President also had strong feelings and opinions on certain subjects. He had strong feeling with regard to US prestige and respect for our good faith and would not be prepared to have them put in question by anybody. There was, for example, the case of Lumumba’s death; USG had had no part whatsoever in his death and yet when certain people “pushed the button,” demonstrations occurred simultaneously against American Embassies in forty different countries. There had also been the mob action against our Embassy in Rangoon. We were not prepared to accept such actions with equanimity. Riots inspired or abetted by Governments against our Embassies were something we were “not having” and we looked to governments to take the proper steps to prevent them.
Barrington, after taking rather confused exception to implication that February 21 riot against Embassy Rangoon had been government-inspired (Note: It was in fact inspired by anti-US propaganda fed to press by Burma Army), sought to defend role of Rangoon police on that occasion, although he acknowledged police had not handled situation February 21 as well as they might have. Prime Minister had been out of town; other cabinet ministers had been indecisive; police had hesitated to start shooting; but two people were killed and fifty or more injured by police action.
After some further discussion about KMTs, the Secretary outlined briefly the current US position on Laos. The Russians had not yet replied to British proposal that cease-fire be agreed upon, to be followed by reactivation of ICC and convoking of 14-nation conference. British proposal, supported by USG, represented clear test of Communist intentions. If Communist countries persisted in their military and subversive efforts, “there would be trouble in Laos.” The Secretary believed that neither Burma nor other comparable nations wanted to see Laos go Communist.
Barrington agreed Burma did not want Communists to take over Laos. He supposed Russian hesitation in responding to British proposal had been occasioned by ChiCom objection to having an Indian again serve as Chairman of ICC in view of present tension in ChiCom-Indian relations. The Secretary said that since Burma realized the threat which Communism represented for Laos, GUB could play a most important part in the 14-Nation conference deliberations when the time came.
The Secretary asked Barrington if all other aspects of US-Burmese bilateral relationship were in reasonably good order. Barrington indicated he believed they were. The Secretary told Barrington that although American Ambassador in Rangoon was always available, he, himself, had retained his genuine interest in Burma and would be willing to hear personally from Barrington or other Burmese officials if they wished to bring some particular point to his attention in that way.
Snow
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690B.93/3–3161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and CINCPAC.
1 Rusk was in Bangkok attending the SEATO Council meeting March 27–29.
http://history.state.gov/
မိတ္ဆက္စကား
ျမန္မာႏိုုင္ငံ၏ ပထမဆံုး ၀န္ႀကီးခ်ဳပ္ ဦးႏု၏ ႏွစ္ တရာျပည့္ ေမြးေန႕အထိမ္းအမွတ္အျဖစ္ ၂၀၀၇ ခုႏွစ္ ေမလ ၂၅ရက္ေန႕တြင္ U NU OF BURMA web site http://peoplewinthrough.com/ကို အင္တာနက္ စာမ်က္နာအျဖစ္ U Nu of Burma Group မွတင္ခဲ့ပါသည္။ ျမန္မာျပည္၏ ႏိုင္ငံေရး အေျခအေန လူးလြန္႕မႈေၾကာင့္ သမိုင္း၀င္ အေထာက္အထား ဓါတ္ပံံု စာရြက္စာတမ္း စာအုပ္ မွတ္တမ္းမွတ္ရာမ်ား တိမ္ျမဳပ္ ေပ်ာက္ကြယ္ေနယၤုမွ်မက ထိန္ခ်န္ ေဖ်ာက္ဖ်က္ ခံခဲ့ရသည့္အတြက္ မိသားစု၀င္မ်ား သိမ္းဆီးထားသည့္ ဓါတ္ပံု စာအုပ္ မွတ္တမ္းမွတ္ရာ အၾကြင္းအက်န္မွ်ျဖင့္ ဦးႏုရာျပည့္ကို တည္ေဆာက္ခဲ့ရျခင္း ျဖစ္ပါသည္။
အၾကြင္းအက်န္ဟု ၀ိေသသျပဳရသည္မွာ မိသားစုမ်ား၏ အိုးအိမ္ဆိုသည္မွာ စစ္ေထာက္လွမ္းေရး အဆက္ဆက္ အႀကိမ္ႀကိမ္ ေမႊေႏွာက္ ေျမလွန္ အဖန္ဖန္ခံရၿပီးကာမွ အဟုတ္ကိုၾကြင္းပီး အမွန္ပင္က်န္ေနသည္ကို ညႊန္းဆိုျခင္းျဖစ္ပါသည္။
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သမိုင္း၀င္ အေထာက္အထား ဓါတ္ပံံု စာရြက္စာတမ္း စာအုပ္မွတ္တမ္းမွတ္ရာမ်ား ေပးပို႕ကူညီမႈကိုလည္း ဖိတ္ေခၚအပ္ပါသည္။
သမိုင္း၀င္ အေထာက္အထား ဓါတ္ပံံု စာရြက္စာတမ္း စာအုပ္မွတ္တမ္းမွတ္ရာမ်ား ေပးပို႕ကူညီမႈကိုလည္း ဖိတ္ေခၚအပ္ပါသည္။
u_nu_of_burma@yahoo.com သို႕မဟုတ္ kabarmakyay@gmal.com သို႕ ဆက္သြယ္ႏိုင္ပါေၾကာင္း။
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